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ABSTRACT
In this paper we estimate a model of production and investmentbased on the
theory of dynamic duality and are particularly interested in the effectsof R&D
spillovers and in calculating the social and private rates ofreturn. We iden-
tify and estimate three effects associated with the intraindustryR&D spillover.
First, costs decline as knowledge expands for theexternality—receiving firms.
Second, production structures are affected, as factor demandschange in response
to the spillover. Third, the rates of capital accumulationare affected by the
R&D spillover. These cost—reducing, factor—biasing andcapital adjustment
effects of the spillover are estimated for four industries.
The existence of R&D spillovers implies that the socialand private rates of
return to R&D capital differ. We estimate that the socialreturn exceeds the
private return in each industry. However, there is significantvariation
across industries in the differential between the social andprivate rates of
return.
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Ottawa, Ontario 269 Mercer Street, 7th floor
Canada K1S 5B6 New York, N.Y. 100031.Introduction*
In many industries firms undertake research and development (R&D)
investment in order to develop new products or new processes. A feature of
R&D investment that distinguishes it from other forms of investment is that
the firm which will do the investing is not often able to exclude others from
freely obtaining the benefits from its R&D projects. The benefits from R&D
investment spill over to other firms in the economy, although the recipient
firms have not paid for the use of the knowledge generated by the R&D
activity.
The significance of spillovers in modeling and estimating the effects of
R&D investment has been emphasized by Criliches (1979). Recent theoretical
work [see Reinganuni (1981), and Spence (1984)] has analyzed the implications
of R&D spillovers in terms of a dynamic model of industry conduct and
performance. In particular, Spence has shown that through spillovers a firm's
R&D investment reduces production costs of rival firms. Thus theindustry-
wide cost-reduction effect of R&D investment is enhanced.Simultaneously,
however, because spillovers generate free-rider problems, a firm's incentive
to undertake R&D activity is diminished.
The trade-off between the cost-reducing (or productivity) effect and the
incentive effect of R&D investment may be exaggerated. Mowery (1983) and
Nelson (1982) have argued that in order for firms to be able touse the freely
available knowledge they may have to invest in R&D. In other words, firms
must have their own laboratories and staffs of scientists and engineers in
order to incorporate the knowledge obtained through spillovers into theirown
production process. This has been shown by Cohen and Levinthal (1986) to imply
-1-that availability of spillovers also provides an incentive for a firm to
undertake its own R&D investment, and can lead to an increase in industry R&D
capital.
There has been very little empirical work devoted to the examination of
the cost-reducing and incentive effects of R&D spillovers. Evenson and Kislev
(1973) estimated the productivity effect of R&D spillovers in wheat and maize
for a cross section of countries. They concluded that borrowed knowledge
caused a strong and persistent increase in crop yields. Levin and Reiss
(1984) found that spillovers had a small but statistically significant effect
in reducing average production costs for a cross section of manufacturing
industries. Jaffe (1984) also estimated the productivity effect of
spillovers. Re found for a cross section of firmsoperatingin various
manufacturing industries that total factor productivity grew factor in
response to spillovers.
The purpose of this paper is to develop and estimate a dynamic model
incorporating intraindusry R&D spillovers in order to investigate both the
cost-reducing and incentive effects of these spillovers. The emphasis is on
the manner by which production and investment decisions are influenced by R&D
spillovers. In particular, estimates are obtained for the spillovers effects
on the demands for R&D and physical capital, as well as on variable and
average costs of production.
The framework for this empirical work is the adjustment cost model of
investment and factor demands. The approach is based on the theory of dynamic
duality [see Rockafeller (1970), Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979), McClaren
and Cooper (1980), and Epstein (1981)] because of the ease by which closed
-2-form solutions are obtained in dynamic models containing more thanone quasi-
fixed factor of production. It is assumed that a firm minimizes intertem-
porally expected production costs subject to a technology which includes
adjustment costs associated with the quasi-fixed inputs (physical and
knowledge capital), along with the spillovers emanating from R&D capital of
rival firms. Indeed it is the existence of these spillovers which
distinguishes investment in plant and equipment from R&D capital accumulation.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical
development of our model. The model is characterized by dynamic duality and
includes R&D spillovers. Section 3 contains the empiricalspecification of
the model, a description of the data, and the estimates for thechemical,
petroleum, machinery and instrument industries. Section 4 highlights the
effects of R&D spillovers on production costs and the structure ofproduction
in both the short and long-runs. The next section contains thedevelopment
and estimates of the social rate of return to R&Dcapital for each industry.
The last section contains oursummary and conclusions.
-3-2. The Theoretical Model
R&D spillovers are embodied in the technology of a firm which can be
represented by
(1) y(t)
where y(t) is the output flow, K(t) is the physical capital service flow,
L(t) is the variable factor service flow, and K(t) is the R&D capital
service flow. The R&D spillover is given by the variable X(t), which is the
R&D capital service flow of other firms in the economy. Indeed,
X(t) =EfK(t),where the summation is taken over all firms other than the
one whose technology is represented by equation (1). The parameter 0cap-
tures the extent to which R&D capital is appropriable. If 0=0 then R&D cap-
ital is completely appropriable and there are no spillovers; if 0=1 then R&D
capital is completely inappropriable and all knowledge is common; and if
0 < 0 < 1,then there is incomplete appropriability.
The presence of investment, which is given by I.(t), i=p (physical) and
i=r (R&D), in the specification of the technology implies that there are
internal adjustment costs associated with changes in the level of the capital
inputs (i.e. the quasi-fixed factors). These adjustments costs are measured
in terms of foregone output [see Treadway (1971, 1974), Mortensen (1973) and
Epstein (1981)]. Thus, with the production function denoted by F, increases
in investment decrease output at a decreasing rate. However, increases in the
variable, physical and R&D capital inputs increase output at a decreasing
rate. 1
-4-There are three effects associated with the R&D spillover. First, from
the production function given the inputs and investment, changes in thespil-
lover generate changes in the quantity of output. This is theproductivity
effect. Second, given input levels and the investment rateschanges in the
R&D spillover cause factor substitution. Indeed, the variable factor,physi-
cal capital and R&D capital may be complements or substitutes to thespil-
lover. It is important to note that not only R&D capitalresponds to the
spillover, but in principle each factor of production can be affectedby
knowledge obtained from other firms in the economy. In the language of the
technological change literature, changes in the R&D spillover cause factor
biases, which may be either factor using or factor reducing.2
Because the technology incorporates adjustment costs, there isa third
effect. Given output and factor quantities in the productionfunction,
changes in the R&D spillover cause quasi-fixed factor adjustment as the rates
of investment change. Thus the dynamic nature of the modelimplies that the
incentive effect associated with the R&D spillovercan be attributed to two
sources: changes in factor demands and changes in quasi-fixed factor accumula-
tion.
The specification of the R&D spillover embodied intechnology is quite
general and encompasses the specifications found in the theoretical litera-
ture. Reinganum (1981) and Spence (1984) assume that a firm'sown R&D capital
is a perfect substitute for borrowed R&D capital. Thus in thepresent context
A =K+OXenters the production function where A is the firm's R&Dcap- r r r r
ital which consists of its own and borrowed knowledge stocks denotedby K
and OXrespectively. Cohen and Levinthal (1986) assume that
-5-Ar =Kr+y(K)9Xwhere-y represents the firm's knowledge absorption func-
tion which is increasing at a decreasing rate as the firm's own R&D capital
expands and 0 < -y(K) < 1. In their model own and borrowed R&D capital are
not perfect substitutes, but the rate of substitution (all other things con-
stant in the production function) between own and borrowed R&D capital is
independent of both the production technology and all non-R&D capital factors
of production. The rate of substitution depends only on the knowledge absorp-
tion function and the size of borrowed R&D capital. However, in our model, we
have generalized the factor substitution possibilities: own and borrowed R&D
capital may be substitutes or complements and the rate of substitution depends
on the nature of the technology, all factors of production and rates of
investment.
The accumulation of physical and R&D capital stocks is governed by
(2) I. I, -5K. , i=p,r
where 0 ￿ 8. ￿ 1, i=p,r are the fixed rates of depreciation of the two
types of capital stocks.3
The cost of the variable factor, of purchasing physical capital and of
developing knowledge capital are
(3) c = +
Pp'p+PrIr
where c are normalized (by the variable factor) costs, p. (i=p,r) is the
normalized (or relative) investment price and G, the variable factor require-
-6-ments function, is derived by inverting the production function (denoted by F
in equation (1)).
The objective of the firm in any base period, with given relative prices,
output, and other firms' knowledge capital, is to minimize the present value
of costs over an infinite horizon by selecting the rates of investment subject
to the process of capital accumulation. Current relative prices, output and
R&D capital of other firms are expected to persist indefinitely. As the base
period changes and new magnitudes of these variables are observed, the firm
revises its expectations and its plans. Hence only at the base period is the
plan actually carried out.
The firm's problem can be written as
(4) nin Je_0t[C(Kp,K,9x,Ip,I,y) + wK + wK]dt
subject to equation set (2) with positive and given initial capital stocks,
0 4 .
K(O)K. > 0, i=p,r.The prices w—p.(p+S.), i=p,r are the relative
rental rates of the capital stocks, and p is the discount rate.5
Rather than solve the primal problem given by (4), we can approach the
problem from the dynamic dual by defining the minimized present value of
normalized costs as which [from Dreyfus (1965), Arrow
and Kruz (1970) and Epstein (1981)] satisfies,
(5) pJ(K ,K ,OX ,w ,w ,y) =G(KK OX ,Ie le y) + w K + w K + J (IeS K )+J (Ie5 K ) prr p r p,rr p r pprr pp pp r r Ir
where the superscript e denotes the equilibrium rates of investment and
-7-J. =8J/3K.,i =p,r.The investment demand functions implied by equation
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Solving equation set (6) for 1andsubstituting into equation (5)yields






where w = = ,andthe superscript T
w J
r r
denotes vector transposition. The demand functions are dependent on the R&D
spillover because the latter affects the minimized present value of normalized
costs (i.e. the value function J), which, in turn, is used to determine vari-
able factor and investment demands.
-8-3. Empirical Specification and Estimation
In order to estimate equation set (7), the value function, J, must be
specified and an error structure imposed. We hypothesize the following form
for the value function,
(8) =
5b0y+ 5TB + (TA-i + aT)K
+(wTAc + a0)X + TAi(h + by) + h0.
The parameters in the right side of (8) are given by the scalars
b0, a0, h0,




a2 c2 h2 b2
b11 b12 -1 a11 a12 -l and the matrices B = A=
ww wK
b21b22 a21 a22
The form of the value function is a generalized quadratic in the factorprices
and linear in output, the capital stocks, and R&D spillover. There are two
attractive features of this functional form. First, the form of the function
is preserved over the production, cost and value functions. In other words it
is self-dual in the sense of Lau (1976). Second, the form is consistent with
aggregation across production technologies, [for example across plants or
across firms, see Epstein and Denny (1983)].
There are certain restrictions which the parameters in the model must
satisfy. The parameters in the B matrix form a symmetric matrix which
-9-must be negative definite so that variable costs are strictly concave in the
factor prices. Thus b.. =b..and b.. < 0,(b..b.. -b.)> 0 for
13 31 1i 11 33 13
i,j 1,2,ij. The parameters in the matrix AWK must be such that the
matrix characterizing capital adjustment, p12 -AWK,is stable, where 12 is
the 2 x 2 identity matrix. Thus, 0 < (a.. -p)< 1 and
(a..-p)(a..-p) -a12a21> 0 for i,j =1,2,ij. In addition, the vector a
must be negative so that variable costs are decreasing in the capital stocks.
The corresponding investment and variable factor demand functions,
implied by the specification of the value function, are found by substituting
(8) and the appropriate derivatives into equation set (7),
(9.1) Le =•5b0y
-.5WTBwy + h0 paTK -aTI+ a0X
(9.2) =
AKBwy + h by + cXr + (pI2AK)K.
From equation (9.1) we can see that the form of the value function does not
restrict the degree of returns to scale for the production process, as equi-
proportional changes in output, the capital stocks, the rates of investment
and the R&D spillover do not lead to the same proportional change in the vari-
able factor demand.
The R&D spillover affects all the demand functions. Through the para-
meter a0, the R&D spillover directly affects the variable factor demand or
normalized variable costs.6 In addition, the normalized variable costs are
indirectly affected by the spillover through the investment demands. Each of
the investment demands is also directly affected by the R&D spillover through
the parameters c1 and c2.7
-10-Notice that from (9.2) the net investment equations are of the flexible
accelerator variety with
(10) M(K -KS)+ CXr
where M =p12
-AKis the adjustment matrix given the rival firm's stock of
knowledge and KS(pIzAK)'AK(Bwy + h + by). The vector KS denotes the
stationary or long-run level of the capital stocks when there is no effect of
the R&D externality on net investment (so that c=0). In this situation
investment is governed by the traditional accelerator. However, the R&D spil-
lover may still be present, since it is possible for
a00. If c =0and
a00 then the R&D spillover has a cost-reducing or productivity effect but
there is no adjustment effect associated with the capital inputs. If there
are capital adjustments caused by the R&D spillover then c0 and the long-
run vector of capital stocks is
(11) K KS -M'CXr
The difference between K and KS
,giventhe adjustment matrix N, depends on
the extent to which the long-run capital stocks are complements to (c. > 0,
i=l,2) or are substitutes for (c. < 0 ,i=l,2)the R&D spillover.
The adjustment path (given by (10)) for any type of capital stock depends
on three elements. First, net investment for the ith capital stock depends on
the magnitude of the stock through p-a... Second, net investment of i
depends on its complementarity to or substitutability with the j' capital
stock through -a.. Third, the path is governed by the complementarity to or
substitutability with the R&D spillover, which is given by c.
-11-Equation set (9) is our preferred specification. The equations are non-
linear in the parameters, with parameter restrictions within and across equa-
tions. Error terms reflecting optimizing and measurement errors are appended
to equation set (9). These error terms are uT(u,u,u) which are assumed
tobe jointly normally distributed,with zero mean, E(u) 0,and with posi-
tive definite symmetric covariance matrix, E(uuT) =®'N' where U is a
3 x 3 matrix and the subscript N represents the number of observations.8
Equation set (9) can be estimated by the nonlinear maximum likelihood
estimator. In order to estimate the system we take a discrete approximation
with 1 =K(t)e-K(t-l),K =K(t-l)and X =X(t-l),so that equations










(12.2) K(t)/y(t) =(a..b..+a..b..)w.(t)+(a..b.. + a..b..)w.(t)
+ h./y(t)+b.+(1+p-a..)K.(t-1)/y(t)-a..K.(t-1)/y(t)
+cjX(tl)/y(t)+u.(t),i,j=p,r,ij.
The data used to estimate equation set(12)pertain to thechemical
(SIC 28), petroleum (SIC 29), machinery(SIC 35),and instruments (SIC 38)
industries.The time period of the sample is 1965-1978 for each industry. In
-12-addition there are 22 firms in the chemical industry, 5 firms in the petroleum
industry, 13 firms in the machinery, and 15 firms for instruments. The model
has been estimated for each industry and the time series and cross section
data were pooled. The majority of the data was obtained from the National
Bureau of Economic Research's R&D Master file [see Cummins, Hall and Laderman
(1982)]. Each firm's R&D capital (exclusive of the spillover, which is
referred to as Kr) was constructed by the declining balance formula for
depreciation with an assumed depreciation rate of 0.1. The initial level of
R&D capital was obtained by dividing constant dollar R&D expenditures by the
sum of the depreciation rate, and the average rate of growth of output.
Output (y) is sales divided by the producer price index defined at the two
digit SIC level. The latter was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
With the R&D capital for each firm, we were able to measure the R&D capital
relating to rivals in the industry confronting each firm (this is variable
X). Physical capital (K) is the deflated net plant value from the Master
File, while the variable factor (L) is the constant dollar value of opera-
ting costs. The depreciation rate for physical capital was 0595 for chemi-
cals, 07l3 for petroleum, •0707 for machinery and O56O for instruments.
These depreciation rates were calculated by suniming over time depreciation
allowances divided by the gross plant and equipment and then dividing this sum
by the number of time periods. Depreciation allowances were obtained from the
Master File. The physical capital price index (p) is the national fixed
investment deflator and the R&D capital price index (p) was developed at
the NBER [see Cuimnins, Hall and Laderman (1982, p. 15)]. The discount rate
(p) is the mean of the preferred divided rate for medium risk companies (see
Cummins, Hall and Laderman (1982, p. 15)], which is 07l9.
-13-The estimation results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The system of
equations converged with a criterion of -001, and although we cannot be sure
we are at a global maximum of the likelihood function, different initial
values of the parameters led to virtually identical estimates. The estimates
satisfy the optimality conditions since b. <0,(b. .b.. -b2.)>0,
i_i i]_ Jj 13
0 <a•<l+p,[(a..-p)(a..-p) -a,.a..]>0and a. <0,for i,j1,2.
Beforewe investigate the effects of the R&D spillover on the structure
of production, costs and rates of return, it is interesting to discuss the
adjustment process for physical and R&D capital. The speed at which physical
capital adjusts is given by (a11-p), when the stock of knowledge capital is
fixed. We can refer to this adjustment process as the own effect. The
estimation results show that 42 percent of the adjustment for physical capital
in the chemical industry occurs within a single year. This means that it
takes 2.4 years for physical capital to adjust. Similarly for the petroleum,
machinery and instrument industries physical capital adjusts in 3.1 years, 2.4
years, and 2.9 years respectively.
The speed of the own adjustment process for R&Dcapital is given by the
valueof (a22-p) when physical capital is fixed. For the chemical,
petroleum, machinery and instrument industries, we find that R&D capital
adjusts in 2.6 years, 2.3 years, 2 years, and 2.5 years respectively. Clearly
the adjustment speeds with respectto the owneffects are quite similiar for
both capital stocks in all four industries.
Thereare also cross effects associated with the adjustment processes of
thecapital stocks. These effects are given by -a•, ij.The coefficient





































































































Log Likelihood Function:1696.336 Log LikelihoodFunction: 466.4205
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Log Likelihood Function:521.7933 Log LikelihoodFunction: 1001.443
Not estimated; constrained to be zero.
-16-R&D capital, and -a21 defines the converse adjustment. Thus, for the chemi-
cal industry we find a deficient stock of R&D capital (relative to its long-
run level) causes the adjustment of physical capital to slow down by 2.9 per-
cent in one year. Conversely, if physical capital is below its long-run
level, then the speed of adjustment for R&D capital to slow down by 1.0 per-
cent in a single year. In the chemical industry the cross effects associated
with the adjustment processes generate a complementarity, since a smaller
stock of one type of capital slows down the speed of adjustment of the other
stock.
The cross effects for the remaining three industries are quite distinct
from the chemical industry. For petroleum a deficient R&D capital stock
causes the adjustment of physical capital to slow down by almost 20 percent.
This effect is similiar in direction but significantly greater than that found
for chemicals. However, physical capital does not affect the adjustment proc-
ess of the R&D stock in the petroleum industry.
In the machinery and instruments industries the results are quite
similiar to each other. As for chemicals and petroleum, decreases in R&D cap-
ital slow down the adjustment process for physical capital; 12 percent and 7
percent for machinery and instruments respectively. However, a decrease in
physical capital actually speeds up the process of R&D adjustment. In both
industries the magnitudes are very small; slightly more than •5 percent for
machinery and 25 percent for instruments. Hence, in all four industries the
adjustment in R&D capital has a complementary effect on the adjustment of
physical capital, but the converse is not true. The complementarity implies
that the accumulation of knowledge causes firms to invest in physical capital.
-17-However, investing in physical capital does not necessarily mean that firms
undertake more R&D capital accumulation.9
Changes in the R&D spillover also affect the rates of investment of both
quasi-fixed factors through the parameters c1 and c2. From Tables 1 and 2,
we can observe that the estimates of these two parameters are very small. The
estimates of c2 are negative and consequently an increase in the R&D spil-
lover decreases the rate of accumulation of R&D capital. This result implies
that the spillover is a substitute for a firm's own R&D capital investment and
so the firm can afford to divert resources away from the accumulation of its
own R&D capital. The esitmates of c1 are also negative for three out of the
four industries. An increase tn the R&D spillover increases the rate of
accumulation of physical capital only for the machinery industry.
-18-.4. R&D Spillover Effects on Production
R&D spillovers cause average costs to decline and factor proportions to
change for the spillover-receiving firms. These cost-reducing and factor-
biasing effects of R&D spillovers can be determined from equation set (12).
Differentiating equation set (12) by X(t-l), yields, in elasticity form,






where e9, j=p,r, are the short-run R&D spillover elasticities of factor
demands (physical capital, R&D capital and the variable factor).'°
The spillover elasticity of average costs in the short-run is formed by
noting that normalized costs of production are given by the right side of
equation (5). Using the specification of the value function (equation (8)),
we can write equation (5) as
(14) cS(t)=Le(t)+ WT(t)tK(tl)+{T(t)A1 + aT)(Ke(t)-K(t-l)]
where cs(t)arethe short-run costs.11 Since Le(t) and Ke(t) arefunctions of
theR&D spillover, by dividing through (14) by output and differentiating with




-19-where eS9 is the spillover elasticity of average costs, s, i=,p,r is
the short-run cost share of the three factor demands and is the
determinant of the matrix AWK. The spillover elasticity of average costs
consists of two parts. The first part relates to the effect of the spillover
on average variable costs and the second to the effect of the spillover on the
adjustment costs per unit of output. The latter component is divided into the
adjustment costs associated with each of the two quasi-fixed factors.
The results for the four short-run elasticities are presented in Table 3.
For each industry, we observe that the short-run demand for R&D capital
decreases in response to an increase in the R&D spillover. Thus the spillover
is R&D capital-reducing (or saving). In other words the spillover is a sub-
stitute for a firm's own R&D capital. The elasticities are quite small how-
ever. The spillover is also physical capital-reducing for three of the
industries. In the machinery industry the spillover is physical-capital
using. As for R&Dcapital,the spillover elasticities for physical capital
are highly inelastic. In the short-run both variable costs and average costs
decline in response to a larger R&D spillover. In each of the four industries
the effects are small. Indeed average costs do not decrease by more than .2
percent for a 1 percent increase in the R&D spillover.
The long-run effects of the R&D spillover are derived from equation set
(12), but with K.(t) =K.(t-l),i=p,r ,anddifferentiating with respect to
X(t-1). This yields
(16.1) e9(t) =(c1(a22-p) -c2a12)X(t-1)/K1(t)H
-20-Table 3
Short-Run Effects of R&D Spillovers
for




Chemical Petroleum Machinery Instruments
R&D Capital -.2559 E-Ol - .3918E-0l -.3229 E-01-.9974 E-02
Physical Capital -.4274 E-01 - .4985E-Ol .4382 E-01 -.1233 E-01
Variable Costs -.1992 - .2090 -.1076 E-Ol -.8288 E-01
Average Costs -.1030 - .1740 -. 3007E-01-.5286 E-0l
*
Basedon a 1 percent increase in the R&D spillover.
-21-(16.2) e9(t) =(c2(a11-p) - c1a21)X(t-1)/K1(t)H
(16.3) e9(t) =(a0X(t-1)+a1pK(t)e9(t)+a2pK(t)e(t))/L(t)
(16.4) e9(t) =s(t)e9(t)+s(t)e9(t)+s(t)e9(t),
where e, i=p,r,..2,c is the long run spillover elasticity on physical capi-
tal, R&D capital, the variable factor (or variable costs) and average costs
respectively. Also, H =a11a22-a12a21.The long-run spillover results are pre-
sented in Table 4. Not surprisingly the long-run spillover elasticities of
the quasi-fixed factors are more elastic than in the short-run. In addition,
the signs have not changed between the short and long-runs. Moreover in the
long-run the elasticities for physical and R&D capital are still highly
inelastic. Variable and average costs also decrease in the long-run as the
R&D spillover increases. The effects on variable and average costs are gener-
ally quite similar between the short and long-runs, and therefore are sig-
nificantly inelastic in the long-run.
-22-Table 4
Long-Run Effects of R&D Spillovers
for




Chemical Petroleum Machinery Instruments
R&D Capital -.7430 E-0l -.7237 E-0l -.1136 -.3156 E-01
Physical Capital -.9861 E-01 -.1353 .8218 E-01-.2465 E-01
Variable Costs -.1014 -.2444 -.6072E-Ol-.1048
Average Costs -.9541 E-01 -.1766 -.3502 E-01-.6493 E-Ol
*
Basedon a 1 percent increase in the R&Dspillover.
-23-5. The Social Rate of Return to R&D Capital
The existence of R&D spillovers implies that a wedge is created between
the private and social rates of return to R&D capital. The derivation of the
social rate of return for each industry can be derived from a program charac-
terizing joint (in other words for all the firms in the industry) intertem-
poral cost minimization. For any industry the joint present value of normal-
ized costs can be written as
(17) W(O) =e_1t1[Gi(Kl,Kl,OXl,Il,Ii,yi)+p11+PrI]dt
where the superscript i represents a firm in the industry and -yis the
discount rate for the industry. The problem is to minimize the right side of
(17) by selecting the rates of investment for each firm subject to the capital
accumulation process characterized by equation set (2). This is a relatively
standard optimal control problem except there exists R&D spillovers. The
Euler equation for R&D investment is
(18) (i+6)r+3G'/'3]
-(aO'/3I') = - (3G'/8K1)- ,i=1,.. .n.
Equation(18)shows that the industry invests in R&D until the marginal cost
of R&D capital for the firm (given by the left side of (18)) equals the
marginal benefit. The latter is defined as the reduction in the ith firm's
variable costs and the net reduction in the variable costs of every other firm
in the industry as the ith firm's R&D capital is expanded.
Clearly, the industry's intertemporal cost minimization solution differs
from the individual firm's solution because of the spillovers associated with
-24-the R&D capital stocks. The spillover are externalities to the firm but they
are internalized by the industry. Indeed, the ith firm's condition with
respect to R&D investment implied by the problem in (4) is,
(19) (,o+5)(P+(3G'/3I')) -(3O'/a11)=-(aG'/3K'), i=l,... ,n.
Subtracting (19) from (18) to obtain the difference between the industry and
firm solutions, we find that
(20) -yp -[E,(3C1/9K')/(p+(801/811)], i=l,.. .,n.
Equation (20) shows that the social rate of return on R&D capital in an indus-
try (which is -y)differs from the private rate (p) by the extent that a
firm's R&D capital reduces the costs of its rival firms throughout the indus-
try.'2 Clearly, if (BG'/8K1) =0,i#j, i,j=l,. .. ,n,then -y=pand
there would not be any wedge between the social and private rates of return.
In order to obtain values for the right side of (20), we need the vari-
able factor requirement function based on the specification of the value func-
tion (denoted as equation (8)). The variable factor requirement function is
given by (12.1). From equation (12.1), .(3G1/3K') =a0(n-1)where n is
the number of firms in the industry. In addition, from (12.1), 3G1/311 =-a2.
Hence equation (20) becomes
(21) 1 =p-a0(n-1)/(p-a2).
Notice that since a0 < 0 ,anda2 < 0 then -y > p. R&D spillovers cause
the social rate of return on R&D capital to exceed the private rate of return.
-25-Table 5 shows the social rate of return on R&D capital for each industry
and percentage by which the social rate exceeds the private rate. The results
vary significantly by industry. For the chemical and instrument industries,
the R&D spillover generates social rates of return which are 29 percent and 35
percent respectively greater than the private rate. However, in the petroleum
industry the social return is substantially (76 percent) above the private
return, while for machinery the spillover only generates a social return 9
percent above the private rate.
There have not been many empirical studies which have investigated the
extent to which intraindustry R&D spillovers create a divergence between the
social and private rates of return on R&D capital. Jaffe (1985) has looked at
spillovers for a cross section of manufacturing firms. Although his frame-
work is quite different from the model in this paper, Jaffe estimated that the
social return on R&D capital is 40 percent higher than would be the case in
the absence of spillovers. Mansfield et al. (1977) conducted an analysis of a
small group of major R&D projects and concluded that the social rate of return
was 77 to 150 percent greater than the private return. The results in this
paper relating to the deviation between the social and private rates of return
are on average consistent with the Jaffe estimates and lower than those
obtained by Mansfield and his colleagues. However, we also find that there
are important industry variations regarding the extent to which the social
return exceeds the private return in the context of intraindustry spillovers.
-26-Table 5
Social Rate of Return on R&D Capital
for
Chemical, Petroleum, Machinery and Instruments Industries








This column pertains to the mean social net of depreciation real rate of
return. The private rate is p =.0719.
-27-6. Suinniary and Conclusions
In this paper we estimated a model of production and investment based on
the theory of dynamic duality. The dynamics arose from the adjustment costs
associated with the accumulation of both physical and R&D capital stocks. The
capital stocks were distinguished by the fact that the returns to R&D invest-
ment were not perfectly appropriable, because spillovers were generated
between firms from the process of R&D capital accumulation.
There are a number of effects associated with the intraindustry R&D spil-
lover. First, costs decline as knowledge expands for the externality-receiv-
ing firms. Second, production structures are affected, as factor demands
change in response to the spillover. Third, the rates of capital accumulation
are affected by the R&D spillover. These cost-reducing, factor-biasing and
capital adjustment effects of the spillover were estimated for four
industries. We found that the spillover decreased the rate of R&D investment
and was R&D capital-reducing in all four industries. The same conclusion
applied to physical capital in three of the four industries. In both the
short and long-runs the quasi-fixed factor-biasing results were highly
inelastic. In the short-run the range of decline in R&D capital was .01 per-
cent to .04 percent, while in the long-run the range was .03 percent to .11
percent. The decrease in physical capital was slightly more elastic with a
range of .01 percent to .05 percent in the short-run and .03 percent to .14
percent in the long-run. In the machinery industry the demand for physical
capital increased in response to the R&D spillover. In the short-run the
increase was .04 percent and in the long-run .08. In addition both variable
and average costs decreased in response to an increase in the R&D spillover.
-28-However, in both the short and long-runs the cost-reducing effects were quite
small. Indeed, the smallest decline in costs was .03 percent and the largest
decrease was .18 percent as the intraindustry spillover increased by 1 per-
cent.
The existence of R&D spiliovers implies that the social and private rates
of return to R&D capital differ. We estimated that the social return exceeded
the private return in each industry. However, there was significant variation
across industries in the differential between the returns. For chemicals and
instruments, the social return exceeded the private return by approximately 30
and 35 percent, respectively. Machinery exhibited the smallest differential
which amounted to about 10 percent. Yet in the petroleum industry the social
rate exceeded the private rate by more than 75 percent.
Empirical work relating to R&D spillovers is only beginning. There are
many avenues to pursue in order to extend the results obtained in this paper.
One of the more important directions is to introduce interindustry spillovers.
There are many situations where industries do not transact with each other,
through input purchases for example, but do "borrow" each other's knowledge
capital. Two industries which fit this situation may be telecommunications
and computers. Another important extension is to the realm of international
R&D spillovers. Indeed there is significant knowledge diffusion through spil-
lovers between Japan and the United States, Europe and the United States, and
the economies in North America.
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1All variables are defined as non-negative real numbers. L(t), 1(t),
1(t) are piecewise continuous functions of t (which denotes the time period)
and K(t), and Kr(t) (and thereby also Xr(t)) are continuous functions of
t with piecewise continuous first derivatives. In addition, from this point
onward in the paper the (t) notation is excluded unless ambiguity arises.
2In the few empirical studies on R&D spillovers that are available the
effects of R&D spillovers on non-R&D capital inputs are assumed away because
production and R&D activities are deemed to be separable [see Evenson and
Kislev (1973), Levin and Reiss (1984), and Jaffe (1984, 1985)].
If the ownandborrowed R&D capital stocks are perfect substitutes then we
can define A =K+ OXK + 9 K. Now R&Dcapitalaccumulates as
r r r r fr
A =+O i =I-SK + GE (1f -SKr). By the definition of K
r r fr r r r £ r r r r
R&D capital accumulation can be written as A =I+If-SA .Inthe
r r f r r r
case of perfect substitutes, knowledge accumulates by the R&D investment of
the firm and the spillover associated with the R&D investment of other firms
-30-in the economy.
The present value of normalized costs is formulated in terms of the state
variables, rather than the controls, due to the fact that the problem can be
transformed by applying integration by parts.
The discount rate is assumed to be constant. This simplifies the empiri-
cal implementation of the model. In empirical dynamic models with more than
one quasi-fixed factor, it is customary to assume that the discount rate is
constant in order to obtain reduced form equations [see Epstein and Yatchew
(1985)] or to use instrumental variable estimation [see Hanson and Singleton
(1982)].
6Since there is a single variable factor of production then variable factor
demand is equivalent to normalized variable costs.
'Theextent to which R&D capital spill over and affects the structure of
production is parameterized by a0,c1 and c2 in the value function. The
spillover parameter (9)is implicitly defined through this parameterization,
as we can consider a0 =a9,and c, =9,i=l,2 ,wherea0, .,and are
also parameters.
8The error term in the variable factor demand equation (9.1) can also
reflect technology stocks. However, if the error terms in (9.2) are to
represent technology stocks, then the error term in (9.1) must be correlated
with the normalized rental rates which would complicate the estimation of the
model.
The speed at which physical capital adjusts in the manufacturing sector,
as estimated by Berndt, Fuss and Waverman (1979) (which was 3.3 years) and by
Morrison and Berndt (1981) (which was 3.7 years) are similiar to our results.
Using dynamic duality, Epstein and Denny found that capital takes 8.3 years to
adjust in the manufacturing sector. The models, however, are not strictly
comparable.
-31-° Since there is a single variable factor, it issynonymous with normalized
variable costs. Hence the elasticity e9 is the R&D spillover elasticity of
normalized variable costs.
In defining (14) we have used the fact that =(JJ) in equation
(5) is equal to (WTAK + aT) using the specification of the value function
from (8).
12The discount rate to a firm (p) is the private net of depreciation real
rate of return on R&D capital. The industry's discount rate (y)is the
social net of depreciation real rate of return on R&D capital. The industry's
return is the social return because all externalities associated with R&D cap-
ital are internalized by the industry.
-32-REFERENCES
Arrow, K., and M. Kurz. (1970). Public Investment, the Rate of Return and
Optimal Fiscal Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
Benveniste, L.M., and J.A. Scheinkman. (1979), "Differentiable Value Functions
in Concave Dynamic Optimzation Problems", Econometrica, 47, 727-732.
Berndt, E.R., M. Fuss and L. Waverman. (1979). A Dynamic Model of Cost of
Adjustment and Interrealted Factor Demands", Institute for Policy Analy-
sis, University of Toronto.
Cohen, W. and D. Levinthal. (1986). "The Endogeneity of Appropriability and
R&D Investment", mimeo.
Cummins, Clint, Bronwyn H. Hall and Elizabeth S. Laderman. (1982). "The R&D
Master File", National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dreyfus, S.E. (1965). Dynamic Programming and the Calculus of Variation, New
York: Academic Press.
Epstein, L.G. (1981). "Duality Theory and Functional Forms for Dynamic Factor
Demands", Review of Economic Studies, 48, 81-95.
Epstein, L., and M. Denny. (1983). "The Multivariate Flexible Accelerator
Model: Its Empirical Restriction and Application to U.S. Manufacturing",
Econometrica, 51, 647-674.
Epstein, L.G., and A.J. Yatchew. (1985). "The Empirical Determination of Tech-
nology and Expectations: A Simplified Procedure", Journal of
Econometrics, 27, 235-258.
Evenson, R.E., and Y. Kislev. (1973). "Research and Productivity in Wheat and
Maize", Journal of Political Economy, 81, 1309-1329.
Criliches, Z. (1979). "Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and
Development to Productivity Growth", Bell Journal of Economics, Spring,
92-116.
-33-Hansen, L.P., and K.J. Singleton. (1982). "Generalized Instrumental Variables
Estimation of Nonlinear Rational Expectations Modelsit, Econometrica, 50,
1269-1286.
Jaffe, A. (1984). "The Effects of Market Demand, Technological Opportunity and
Research Spilloevers on R&D Intensity and Productivity Growth", mimeo.
(1985). "Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence
from Firms' Patents, Profits and Market Value," mimeo.
Lau, L. (1976). "A Characterization of the Normalized Restricted Profit Func-
tion", Journal of Economic Theory, 12, 131-163.
Levin, R.C., and P.C. Reiss. (1984). "Tests of a Schumpsterian Model of R&D
and Market Structure", in Z. Griliches (ed.), R&D. Patents and
Productivity, National Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago, Ill.:
University of Chicago Press.
Mansfield, E. et al. (1977). "Social and Private Rates of Return from Indus-
trial Innovations" uarterly Journal of Economics, 77, 221-240.
Mclaren, K., and R. Cooper. (1980). "Intertemporal Duality: Application to the
Theory of the Firm", Econometrica, 48, 1755-1762.
Morrison, C., and E. Berndt. (1981). "Short-run Labor Productivity in a
Dynamic Model", Journal of Econometrics, 16, 339-365.
Mortensen, D. (1973). "Generalized Costs of Adjustment and Dynamic Factor
Demand Theory", Econometrica, 41, 657-666.
Mowery, D.C. (1983). "The Relationship Between Intrafirm and Contractrual
Forms of Industrial Research in American Manufacturuing, 1900-1940,",
Explorations in Economic History.
Nelson, R.R. (1982). "The Role of Knowledge in R&D Efficiency", Quarterly
Journal of Economics. 97, 453--470.
-34-Reinganuni, J.F. (1981). "Dynamic Games of Innovation", Journal of Economic
Theory, 25, 21-41.
Rockafeller, R.T. (1970). "Conjugate Convex Functions in Optimal Control and
the Calculus of Variations", Journal of Mathematical Analysis and
Ailications, 32, 411-427.
Spence, A.M. (1984). "Cost Reduction, Competition and Industry Performance",
Econometrica, 52, 101-121.
Treadway, A. (1974). "The Globally Optimal Flexible Accelerator", Journal of
Economic Theory, 7, p. 17-39.
(1971). "The Rational Multivariate Flexible Accelerator",
Econometrica, 39, 845-856.
-35-